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INSTITUTIONALIZING AN EXPERIMENT: THE
EXTENSION OF THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ACT-QUESTIONS RESOLVED, QUESTIONS REMAINING
CLAIRE ELIZABETH WINOLD

IN

1980, Congress passed a bill creating a far-reaching new liability for the federal government. The Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA) provided that private parties who prevailed in actions
brought by or against the United States could recover attorney's
fees in addition to any other relief awarded. Because of its experimental nature, much of the bill was enacted with sunset clauses
under which the legislation was to terminate automatically in 1984.
In 1985, key provisions of the EAJA were reenacted as permanent
law, along with several clarifying amendments. In this Comment,
the author examines some of the difficulties encountered by courts
in interpreting the original Act. While many of these issues were
resolved by the 99th Congress in its extension of the Act, questions
nevertheless remain. The Comment concludes with some suggestions for analysis in these areas.
I.

BACKGROUND

It is a central tenet of the American litigation experience that
each party, win or lose, must pay his own attorney's fees. This is
the "American rule" in contrast with the "English rule" followed
by most common law countries where prevailing parties normally
recover fees from their opponents.1
The rigors of the American rule have been ameliorated somewhat by reforms regarding access to courts, which include adoption
of the contingency fee system, provision of attorneys to indigent
defendants,2 and simplified judicial processes for small claims and
uncontested divorces.3 Further, the courts have fashioned, through
their equitable powers, a variety of exceptions to the American
rule. One of the earliest was the "common fund" exception which
allowed an award of fees to a party who had created or preserved a
fund. Thus, for example, if a stockholder's suit succeeded in
preventing an unwise corporate expenditure, all the stockholders
1. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 19 (Winter 1984); Whitfield, Where the Wind Blows: Fee Shifting in Domestic Relations Cases, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 811 (1987).
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would pay the fees of the initial litigant from the monies saved.'
Another exception was for "bad faith." Fees were awarded to a
successful party when the opponent had acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 5 Litigants engaging in
dilatory tactics were liable for fees awarded by the courts to their
opponents. Courts imposing this sanction did so by invoking their
right to protect judicial integrity.6
In addition to court-imposed attorney fee-shifting mechanisms,
Congress and state legislatures have included fee provisions in
statutes. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act provides for
the award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs.7 The Clayton
Act also provides for the recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee.6
These and other statutes provide for fee awards between private
parties, abrogating the American rule.9 Fee awards are included as
a remedy along with provisions for injunctions and/or damages.
Some state statutes provide for fee awards to prevailing parties in
a certain category of cases, such as contracts' or actions for damages of $10,000 or less." Other states have fee provisions for specific causes of action including unfair dairy trade practices 2 and
medical malpractice claims. s On the federal and state levels, feeshifting statutes vary in that some provide for mandatory awards
only to plaintiffs-so-called "one-way" shifting-while others
award fees to whichever party prevails in the litigation.", A frequently articulated goal of fee shifting is the promotion of private
enforcement of public policy. Congress increasingly has not relied
on the regulatory agencies alone to implement its policies. Instead,
specific provisions for citizen suits, and often for attorney's fees,
4. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533 (1881).
5. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
6. For a discussion of the "judicial integrity" goal, see Zemans, Fee Shifting and the
Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONrTEMP. PROBS. 187, 190 (Winter 1984).

7. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 7, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49
U.S.C. § 11705(d)(3) (1982)).
8. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(1982)).
9. For a list of federal fee award statutes, see R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 156 (1980).
10. AM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (1984).
11. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.250 (Supp. 1987).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32A.09(1) (West 1987).
13. FLA. STAT. § 768.595 (1985).
14.

See Zemans, supra note 6, at 190, 199.
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have been included in environmental and other regulatory
measures. 5
In the late 1960's and early 1970's some federal courts began to
expand this "private attorney general" theory. Litigants who
sought to further important public interests were awarded fees
from defendants, even in the absence of specific statutory authority. 6 These courts posited that when the legislature enacted statutes protecting certain interests (such as environmental, consumer
protection, and civil rights) litigants enforcing such rights or protecting such interests should not bear the full costs of
representation.
The development of the private attorney general theory was occasionally justified as an extension of the common fund or common
benefit exceptions rather than a radical departure from the established rule.17 The United States Supreme Court, however, considered this development to be too radical, at least to the extent that
the lower courts were implying congressional intent for fee awards
in acts where the statute and its legislative history were silent. In
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,"8 the Court
called a halt to further expansion by judicial discretion of the private attorney general rationale.
The Alyeska litigation was brought by environmental groups attempting to prevent the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits for the construction of the Alaska pipeline allegedly in violation of federal laws. A preliminary injunction was granted in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia based on
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).19 Alyeska and the State of Alaska then
intervened in the lawsuit. The Interior Department subsequently
took steps which were arguably in compliance with both statutes
and the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed based on violations of the Mineral Leas15. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1982).
16. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (collecting cases), rev'd,
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
17. Zemans, supra note 6, at 197.
18. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
19. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 242-43.
20. Id. at 244.
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ing Act without reaching the complex NEPA issues. Congress then
amended the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the permits sought by
Alyeska, effectively mooting the lawsuit. 2 1 There was no authorization for fees in either of the relevant statutes and the Court of
Appeals further noted that the case did not fall within the traditional common benefit or bad faith exceptions.2 2 However, because
the environmental groups had sought to vindicate "important statutory rights" the court held they were entitled to fees.2 3 The court
found that the current law precluded an award against the United
States and deemed it inappropriate to burden the State of Alaska.
The court instead required Alyeska to pay one-half of a fee repre'24
senting "the reasonable value of the services rendered.
The Supreme Court reversed based on a strict adherence to the
American rule. The Court acknowledged the validity of the various
equitable exceptions and further noted that Congress possessed
plenary power to provide attorney's fees under specific statutes.
The Court emphasized, however, that the decision of which statutes to except from the American rule was Congress' alone to make
and that "courts are not free to. . . pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue . . . depending upon
[their] assessment of the importance of the public policies involved

in particular cases. "25
In direct response to Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.26 The Act identified seven
civil rights statutes where fee shifting was necessary for effective
private enforcement2 7 While some civil rights legislation had already provided for fee shifting,2 8 the 1976 Act made fees available
under statutes which had not included such provisions.29 The bulk
21. Id.
22. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. Id. at 1032.
24. Id. at 1036.
25. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269.
26. Pub. L. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
27. The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of. . . [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
28. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-5(k).
29. Id. § 2000a-3(b).

19871

JUSTICE ACT

of awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act come
from private defendants, though the Supreme Court has held that
the Fees Awards Act also applies to state governments.30
In 1979 Congress began to consider a hitherto unprecedented expansion of the statutorily created exceptions to the American rule.
A bill was proposed to award fees to parties prevailing in litigation
against the United States, regardless of the cause of action or
whether the private party was the plaintiff or defendant. The
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), enacted as Title II of the
Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, was a far-reaching
waiver of sovereign immunity.3 1 EAJA's legislative history reveals
an overriding purpose to "remove economic deterrents to contesting government action '3 2 and to discourage government agencies from coercing compliance with regulations which may not otherwise be adequately contested.3 3
EAJA has two analytically separate components. The first authorizes courts to award attorney's fees against the United States
"to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the
common law or under the terms of any statute."34 This provided a
permanent waiver of immunity for cases falling within preexisting
exceptions, such as the bad faith exception." The second and more
significant component provided authority for fee awards to parties
who prevail in a nontort civil action against the government, unless
the "position of the United States was substantially justified or
special circumstances make an award unjust."3 6 Additionally the
United States was made liable for fees incurred by parties in ad30. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
31. Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat.
2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4984 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
33. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4988.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). According to the House Report, this permanent waiver of
immunity "reflects the belief that.., the United States should be held to the same standards in litigating as private parties." HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 9, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG."& AD. NEWS at 4987-88.
35. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
36. The section reads:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ...
incurred
by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or
against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless
the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
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versary agency adjudications.3 7 In both instances, however, million8
aires and small businesses were excluded.
Together, these provisions covered most trials or agency proceedings in which the United States takes an adversary role. They
were considered experimental and were enacted with sunset
clauses. 9 In 1985, these provisions of EAJA, with some clarifying
amendments, were reenacted as permanent law.' 0
II.

"PREVAILING PARTY"

In order to be awarded EAJA fees the litigant opposing the government must be a "prevailing party." The House Report accompanying the original Act indicated that this phrase was to be construed as it had been in other fee-shifting statutes, notably the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act."' Accordingly, parties
who obtained a settlement or a voluntary dismissal would qualify
as prevailing.'2
Although it is clear that a final judgment on the merits is not a
prerequisite to a fee award, courts often require some judicial action before a fee application can be approved. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has labeled a remand of a
Merit Systems Protection Board action for further evidence, a
"purely procedural issue" which did not qualify the petitioners as
prevailing parties. 3
37.

The section provides:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing
party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that
party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the
agency finds that the position of the agency as a party to the proceeding was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982). Fees were authorized for adversary adjudications, but not for
"rulemaking or other administrative proceedings." HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4993. The bill specifically excluded
ratemaking and license applications. 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(3)(C). However, the Report indicated
that this exclusion would not apply to proceedings involving the "suspension, . . . modification or conditioning of license." HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4994.

38. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (b)(1)(B) (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1982).
39. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II § 203(c), 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325,
2327, 2329 (1982) (These "repealer" sections provided that EAJA's provisions would continue to apply through final disposition of any action commenced before the date of repeal.)
40. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat.
183 (1985) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. 2412 (Supp. III 1985)).
41. See supra note 26.
42. House REPORT, supra note 32, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4990.

43.

Austin v. Department of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

1987]

JUSTICE ACT

Although the EAJA does not cover the initial administrative
proceedings of Social Security claimants, it does apply to any judicial review of the decision of the Social Security Administration.""
If a court finds that the Administration's denial of benefits was not
supported by substantial evidence, it may either reverse or remand
for additional agency-level proceedings.4 5 The circuits have agreed
that obtaining a remand alone will not support an award of fees.46
However, if the claimant ultimately succeeds in obtaining benefits
from the Administration he may then apply for fees. This approach was cited with approval in the House Report accompanying
the EAJA extension.47 Construing both the EAJA and the Social
Security Act, the Report states that the remand decision is not a
final judgment, nor is the agency decision after remand. Instead,
the district court (which has retained jurisdiction) should enter an
order affirming, modifying, or reversing the final decision of the
Secretary of the Social Security Administration. Although fees are
not to be awarded for the administrative proceedings, fees incurred
during the court action which resulted in the remand could be
compensated. 8
The courts also have had to determine whether a party should
be awarded fees when it has prevailed on only some of its claims.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart 9 the Supreme Court addressed a similar
issue under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and explicitly stated that its holding would be applicable to other fee44. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C). EAJA does not cover initial administrative proceedings in
Social Security cases because these are not proceedings in which the United States "takes a
position." If a claimant is denied benefits, he may request a reconsideration by the state
agency which has made this determination pursuant to regulations of the Social Security
Administration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1986). If his application is again denied, he may request a review by an administrative law judge. Id. § 404.929. At the review, the claimant
may present witnesses or further evidence. Id. § 404.950. The Social Security Appeals Council will review an unfavorable decision on the claimant's request. Id. § 404.967. If the claim
is still denied, the claimant may appeal to a federal district court within 60 days. Id. §
404.981. It is only at this stage that the Social Security Administration assumes an explicitly
adversarial role to the claimant, as the earlier proceedings were part of a determination
process in which the agency played an ostensibly neutral, information-gathering role.
45. Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 747 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1984); Cook
v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1984).
46. Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 747 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1984); Cook
v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1984); McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
712 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718
F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983).
47. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 19 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 132, 148 [hereinafter cited as 1985 House REPORT].
48. Id. at 20, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 132, 148.
49. 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983).
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shifting statutes. The Court held that where separate theories are
presented and legal work can be allocated accordingly, fees should
be awarded only for hours spent on the successful issue.5 0 However,
where a common core of facts and related theories are presented,
courts should not attempt to separate mechanically the winning
issues from the losing issues. 1
The standard formulated in Hensley has been applied in EAJA
cases. In an action challenging two similar sets of regulations governing smoking on aircraft, only one of which was resolved through
litigation, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that the two actions were part of a single consolidated
process and thus fees could be awarded for work done on both.2
It is essential to look to the substance of the relief sought in
evaluating whether a party has prevailed. In a not untypical scenario, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) petitioned for review
of an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action delaying the
implementation of previously announced reporting requirements
for hazardous waste disposal sites.53 Before any hearing on the
merits, EPA mooted the case by reinstating the requirements. This
was the relief EDF had sought, though it was not obtained pursuant to a court order or formal settlement of the case. The court
held that EDF was a prevailing party under EAJA, as its lawsuit
54
had acted as the catalyst in prompting the agency's action.
When EAJA was reenacted, no substantive changes were made
in the definition of prevailing party. However, condemnation actions stirred controversy in the courts. 55 The legislative history explains a definitional amendment which establishes that the prevailing party is the party whose valuation of the property is closest to
the trial court's ultimate award (the Act will not apply to settlement negotiations in this context). 6 In its amendments to EAJA,
50. Id. at 435.
51. Id.
52. Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
53. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 716 F.2d 915
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 919.
55. Compare United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1983) (EAJA
does apply to condemnation cases), with United States v. 160 Acres of Land, 555 F. Supp.
84 (D. Utah 1982) (EAJA does not apply).
56. 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 47, at 18, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 146-47.
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Congress also clarified and updated the eligibility limits
for indi57
viduals and small businesses or other organizations.
III. POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
EAJA provides fee awards to prevailing parties in nontort civil
actions against the United States unless the position of the United
States was substantially justified or special circumstances would
make the award unjust. In construing the term "position of the
United States" the courts did not have the benefit of interpretations under earlier analogous fee-shifting statutes. This is due to
the unique nature of EAJA in abrogating sovereign immunity. A
split in the circuits developed over whether evaluating the position
of the United States meant scrutiny of its litigation arguments or
the actions which precipitated the litigation. The statute and its
legislative history were ambiguous on this point. For cases brought
under the section authorizing fees in "any civil action," several
courts interpreted the term "civil action" to imply that only the
litigation position should be considered.58 The District of Columbia
Circuit, in Spencer v. NLRB,5 9 thoroughly analyzed the competing
considerations and made an important preliminary assumption: in
most cases there would not be a significant difference between the
two as the government's litigation position would essentially be a
defense asserting the reasonableness of the agency's underlying action. The court relied heavily on the fact that Congress had considered and rejected imposing an automatic fee award when the government was the losing party.6 0 The court reasoned that Congress
did not want to deter the government from making any reasonable
argument in defense of its actions. Therefore, if technical defenses
such as laches, mootness, or lack of jurisdiction could have prevailed, an award of fees was not warranted, even though the court
had found against the government on the merits."
57. Eligibility was expanded to include individuals with a net worth of $2 million or less
and businesses with a net worth of $7 million or less. Businesses also must have no more
than 500 employees. The requirements are imposed when adjudication is commenced. Equal
Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § l(c)(B), 99 Stat. 183,
183 (1985) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B)); id. § 2(c) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(B)). The definition of party was also expanded to include units of local government which met the net worth and employee limits for businesses. Tax exempt organizations under 26 U.S.C. 505(c)(3) are exempt from the net worth limits. Id.
58. E.g., Tyler Business Serve. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982).
59. 712 F.2d 539, 551-52, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
60. Id. at 550.
61. Id. at 555.
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Although a majority of the courts addressing the issue adopted
the litigation position theory, 62 commentators were almost unanimous in their support of the minority or underlying action view. 83
The courts which adopted the underlying action approach looked
to the Act's definition of "United States" for their statutory construction argument. The definition encompassed "any agency and
any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity."6' 4 More fundamentally, these courts found that a broader view
was more consistent with EAJA's purpose and goals as reflected in
its legislative history. To deter abuses, the government should have
"the burden of proving that its action giving rise to the litigation
was substantially justified."5
Congress explicitly ratified this broader interpretation in its
1985 amendments to EAJA.66 Language was added providing,
"[T]he 'position of the United States' means, in addition to the
position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action
or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based
"67 The House Report accompanying the new legislation
stated that this definition was "consistent with the original Congressional intent and the underlying purposes of the statute.""
The Committee expressly rejected the Spencer holding. 9
Although President Reagan had previously vetoed a similar version, expressing a preference for the litigation position formulation,' 0 Congress, working with the Department of Justice, limited
62. See, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 1984); United States
v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
825 (1985); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982); Broad Avenue
Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
63. See, e.g., Kincaid, The Equal Access to Justice Act: Attorneys' Fees When the Position of the United States is not Substantially Justified, 3 REvIEw OF LITIGATION 415, 431
(1983); Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1089, 1106 (1984).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(C) (1982).
65. Dougherty v. Lehman, 711 F.2d 555, 561 (3d Cir. 1983).
66. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §
I(c)(2)(E), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (1985) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1985)); id. at
2(c)(2)(B), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (amending 28 U.S.C. 2412(a) (Supp. III 1985)).
67. Id. § 2(c)(2)(B), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (1985) (amending 28 U.S.C. 2412(a) (Supp. III
1985)).
68. 1985 House REPORT, supra note 47, at 12, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 140-41.
69. Id.
70. Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments: Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R.
5479, 20 WEEKLv CoMp. PREs. Doc. 1814-15 (Nov. 8, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Disapproval].
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the discovery that would be available in fee proceedings. 1 This
limitation alleviated the administration's concern that fee litigation would become an excuse for wide-ranging examination of unrelated agency actions.72
IV.

DETERMINATION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY

JUSTIFIED"

The bulk of the litigation arising under EAJA has revolved
around determining when the government's position can be
deemed substantially justified, thus precluding a fee award to a
prevailing private litigant. The courts appear to have been unable
to develop helpful standards for analysis of this question.
A.

Legislative History and Early JudicialInterpretation

The single suggestion to emerge from the legislative history of
the original Act was that Congress did not intend for fees to be
awarded automatically to all prevailing parties. 7 The drafters were
concerned with forestalling the United States from advancing
"novel but credible" theories in support of its official actions.7 4 Interpretive language from the legislative history was congruent with
standards for evaluating legal arguments in other contexts: "The
test of whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government
can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact,
no award will be made.

'78

Although this is not an especially dis-

criminating standard, virtually all the circuits adopted some form
of the reasonableness test for determining whether the government's position had been substantially justified. 76 The District of
Columbia Circuit found that the drafters had rejected the term
71. Language added to 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) provided: "Whether or not the position of
the agency was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the administrative
record, as a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for which fees and other
expenses are sought." Similar language was added to 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B):
Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justifed shall
be determined on the record (including the record with respect to the action or
failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in
the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
72. Memorandum of Disapproval,supra note 70, at 1815.
73. HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 4989-90.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4989.
76. Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1983); Dougherty v. Lehman, 711
F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1983); Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1983).
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"reasonably justified"; the court alternatively held that the government's position had to be slightly more than reasonable.7 Comparatively, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
interpreted the substantial justification standard as "a middle
ground between an automatic award of fees to a prevailing party
and an award made only when the government's position was
7' 8
frivolous.
The courts were concerned-sometimes explicitly, often sub
silentio-with the potentially limitless liability EAJA seemed to
promise. The Congressional Budget Office had predicted $100 million in annual costs under the original Act. However, between October 1, 1981 (the effective date of the Act), and October 1, 1984
(the sunset date), less than $4 million was awarded.79
B.

The Amendments

The House Report accompanying the amendments contained
some clarifying language as to the meaning of "substantially justified," though the Act itself remained unchanged. The Committee
on the Judiciary agreed with the minority of courts which had held
that substantial justification means more than merely reasonable.80
Although this indicates a preference for a more rigorous standard
for the government, the Committee expected that due to the variety of factual contexts and legal issues involved in EAJA cases, the
determination of what is "'substantially justified' will be decided
on a case-by-case basis." 81
The Report did provide some guidance in the area of review of
agency action. The Committee found puzzling the holdings of certain courts that an administrative decision may be substantially
justified under the Act even when it was reversed because it was
arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial evidence. 8 This statement prompted disagreement on the floors of
the House and Senate during deliberations on the bill. Those who
spoke against this interpretation were concerned that it seemed to
propose automatic awards, which Congress had clearly rejected.8
77.
78.
79.
NEWS
80.
81.
82.
83.

Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Dougherty v. Lehman, 711 F.2d 555, 563 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 47, at 8-9, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
at 137.
Id. at 9, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 137-38.
Id. at 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 138.
Id.
131 CONG. REC. 4763 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statement of Rep. Kindness).
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Senator Thurmond stated that the standard for substantial evidence for review on the merits and the standard for substantial
justification in considering fee awards were separate,
with the lat84
meet.
to
government
the
for
ter being easier
Neither the Committee nor its critics adequately considered the
variety of contexts in which review of agency action takes place.
"Arbitrary and capricious" and "lack of substantial evidence" are
not synonymous. Each is a term of art in the provisions of a category of statutes. A court must ascertain exactly what type of review is authorized before standards for assessing substantial justification can be superimposed. Under the Social Security Act, for
instance, appeals from adverse decisions at the agency level are on
the record; no de novo hearings are held.8 5 The reviewing court
must determine whether the evidence, as reflected in the record,
has been evaluated according to legal standards. These standards
87
are derived from the statute itself,86 the Secretary's regulations,
and from controlling precedent.88 A court's finding of "no substantial evidence" tracks the language of the statute. However, in reality such a determination usually means that the Secretary, in denying benefits, has acted contrary to established legal standards,
not that there was no evidence to support the agency finding.
Under an interpretation of substantially justified, such a finding
should entitle the prevailing claimant to fees for work completed
at the court level. For example, pertinent regulations require that
the Social Security Administration must follow a specified, sequential procedure in evaluating disability claims. One of the steps in
this process requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments are severe, taking into account his physical and mental
84. Id. at 9993 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982).
86. See, e.g., id. at § 423(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (The Social Security Act defines "disability" as: "[T]he inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months ....
").
87. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (1986) (Social Security Administration regulation
requiring: "To meet this definition, you must have a severe impairment, which makes you
unable to do your previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the
national economy.").
88. See, e.g., Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984) (" '[An impairment
can be considered as 'not severe' only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal
effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's
ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.'" (citation omitted)).
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ability to perform "basic work activities." 89 In reviewing a denial of
benefits, a North Carolina district court found that the administrative law judge's (ALJ) findings were "wholly conclusory" and that
"[iun failing to indicate the weight given to relevant evidence
presented" and to "properly consider some of plaintiff's uncontradicted medical evidence, the ALJ violated unambiguous and consistent precedent." 90
The court did not substitute its own evidentiary conclusions for
that of the representative of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. Rather, it found that the ALJ had not followed the jurisdiction's controlling guidelines which specified how the record evidence was to be evaluated. Because appeals of disability determinations constitute a considerable proportion of the federal
caseload, almost all possible types and combinations of evidence
are covered by precedents. Other common fact patterns with clear
standards to be applied include the weight to be assigned the
treating physician's findings, 91 the need to consider subjective
claims of pain,9" and the duty to consider various impairments collectively rather than in isolation. 3
Courts have not hesitated to hold that a demonstrated failure to
follow these requirements precludes a finding that the government's position was substantially justified for EAJA purposes. Indeed, at least within this context, some courts have held that the
government's position is not substantially justified when a denial
of benefits is unsupported by substantial evidence. However,
other courts continue to hold that the absence of "substantial evidence does not equate to a finding that the [Secretary's] position
in the litigation was not substantially justified," while further noting, somewhat paradoxically, that the administrative record may
be "so deficient that the government may not reasonably rely on
it" in supporting a denial of benefits.9 5
A closer question arises when the court remands the case for further factual inquiries. If the claimant is ultimately successful, the
inquiry may focus on the apparent need for additional evidence.
89. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1986).
90. Bunn v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
91. See, e.g., Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679
F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982).
92. Dorf v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1986).
93. Williams v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. II. 1986).
94. Fleming v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 726, 730 (D.D.C. 1986).
95. Wiggins v. Heckler, 639 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D.N.C. 1986); accord Fulton v. Heckler,
784 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Though such cases are often guided by precedents, case-by-case inquiry will be warranted. Reviewing courts, impatient with inadequate development of the record, have occasionally awarded interim benefits to claimants. This equitable power could be applied
to interim fee applications as well." However, the general rule, in
accordance with traditional "prevailing party" analysis, is that fees
97
are not awarded until a final decision after remand is entered.
In cases not involving routinized application of precedents to Social Security claims, the determination of substantial justification
provides an opportunity to ascertain how judges view the judicial
process. Although opinions are often written to portray both sides,
in many cases only the winning side is adequately aired. If a court
denies fees in a case where the government has lost on the merits,
however, it will be in the anomalous position of praising the
strengths of an ultimately losing argument. Prior to the recent
amendments, the majority of circuits examined the government's
litigation position when analyzing its claims to substantial justification. The amendments make clear, of course, that the underlying
action is henceforth to be considered. This will not, however, eliminate in all circumstances the need for analysis of the litigation position. It will be necessary in many cases to evaluate both positions; in some cases, however, only one or the other will be at issue.
C. Post-Amendments Judicial Interpretations
Most courts have moved swiftly to modify their holdings on the
issue of agency versus litigation position. However, some courts
have not adequately understood the clear statutory command that
the agency position must be substantially justified if fees are to be
denied. Unfortunately, one of the rare cases to misread the amendments is also one of the relatively rare cases involving more than
the average estimated award of $5,000 to $6,000.8 In Battles Farm
Co. v. Pierce,e9 the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the
EAJA is "designed to encourage small private plaintiffs and de96. See, e.g., Bradley v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 954 (11th Cir. 1986) (party awarded attorney's
fees for receiving a ruling from a United States magistrate requiring the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to render a decision on benefits or a permanent injunction would issue); see also Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986) (EAJA fees awarded for class
relief entitling over 2,000 claimants to reconsideration after Supreme Court remand).
97. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
98. H. Supp. REP. No. 120 (II), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 151, 153.
99. 806 F.2d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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fendants to persevere against or resist the U.S. government if the
government takes an unjustified litigating position." ' As authority the court cited Spencer and the 1980 enactment, incongruously
adding that the Act "may have assumed an additional purpose as a
result of a recent amendment . . . that requires the government to
also justify its administrative position."101
The Battles Farm litigation involved a challenge to a policy implemented by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in
the late 1970's. The Secretary declined to make congressionally authorized subsidy payments to low-income housing project owners.
The National Housing Act 02 had created the operating subsidy
program to stabilize the rent charged to tenants at thirty percent
of their incomes.10 8 One part of the legislation created a "rental
reserve fund" for the subsidies. Another section authorized the
Secretary to "make, and contract to make" such subsidy payments.
Believing she had discretion to decide that the resources were better spent on other programs, the Secretary refused to make distributions from the fund. 1 4 The project owners challenged both the
refusal to make initial payments to which they were assertedly entitled and the refusal to enter into a long-term contract for such
payments. After a district court decision in favor of the owners on
the payments issue, but for the Secretary on the long-term contract issue, the litigation was held in abeyance pending possible
Supreme Court consideration of other circuits' cases raising the
same issues. 108 Following congressional action eliminating the program, but before any Supreme Court hearing, these cases were
settled.10 6
The Battles Farm appeal was reactivated in 1982.107 The Secretary no longer contested the subsidy payment issue. He 0 8 did,
however, defend the amount awarded against Battles Farm's contention that it should have been calculated based on the higher
rentals that would have been charged had the subsidies been made,
100. Id. at 1101 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at n.9.
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1982).
103. Battles Farm Co. v. Harris, 703 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
104. Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
105. Battles Farm Co. v. Hills, 414 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1976).
106. Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. Battles Farm, 806 F.2d at 1100.
108. When the Battles Farm litigation commenced in 1976, Carla Hills was Secretary of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. was Secretary
when the attorney's fees appeal was argued in 1986.
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rather than on the rent actually charged during the period when
subsidies were wrongfully withheld.10 9 The Secretary also defended
the district court's rejection of the long-term contract claims.1 10
The District of Columbia Circuit agreed with Battles Farm on the
calculation of retroactive subsidies,1 but affirmed the district
court on the long-term contract issue. 112 On Battles Farm's ensuing
application, the district court awarded attorney's fees, determining
that the Secretary's position had not been substantially justified.'"
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 11 4 The court considered only the litigation position, despite acknowledging that the
merits of the Secretary's decision on the rental reserve fund issue
had been decided contrary to precedent. The long-term contract
issue, however, was just as decidedly a winner for the Secretary as
the basic subsidy issue had been a loser. The district court had
found that the two issues were interrelated, but that the rental reserve fund issue was central to the case. Because the government
had "made an admission of insubstantiality" on this issue,
$152,063.60 in fees were awarded.' 5
In reversing, the District of Columbia Circuit turned this interrelatedness against Battles Farm, holding that because the government was justified in defending against one unreasonable claim, its
entire litigating position was justified. The court stated that the
result would probably have been similar had the Secretary's actions been under scrutiny instead of its litigation strategy. However the court offered little analysis in support of this dicta. The
court also noted that the "parties. . . stated that the 1985 revision
of the EAJA has no bearing on the issues in this case."" 6 This
error by Battles Farm's attorneys appeared to compound their earlier error in continuing to argue the worn long-term contract issue.
Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United States"7 is another case
which "fails to focus attention on the unjustified government activity which formed the basis of the litigation.""' This inherent flaw
109. Battles Farm, 806 F.2d at 1100.
110. Id.
111. Battles Farm Co. v. Harris, 703 F.2d at 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 1297.
113. Battles Farm, 806 F.2d at 1101. The district court's opinion is unreported.
114. Id. at 1099.
115. Id. at 1102.
116. Id. at n.16.
117. 757 F.2d 247 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
118. 1985 HousE REPORT, supra note 47, at 12, reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 140.
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illustrated the need for the new amendments. In Essex the plaintiff engineering company prevailed in its bid protest suit. 19 The
Court of Claims had concluded that the underlying agency action
was irrational because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and the General Accounting Office (GAO) had incorrectly determined that Essex's bid was ambiguous. Specifically, the court determined that the FAA and GAO had irrationally and unfairly refused to consider literature Essex had offered showing compliance
with contract specifications. 20 On the EAJA application, the Federal Circuit considered only the litigation stance and stated that
the "merits of the agency decision constitute only one factor in
evaluating the justification for the government's litigating position
in court."' 121 Because the government expressly based two of its
three arguments on the correctness of the agency's action, the only
position that could reasonably be justified was a general, factually
unsupported claim that agency determinations "should be accorded strong deference."

22

Better reasoning is found in a post-amendments case from the
Third Circuit. In Brinker v. Guiffrida,' 2 the court carefully examined the agency actions, the litigation theories, the applicable
regulations, and the actual policy at issue in a coverage dispute
under a residential crime insurance policy issued by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. The appellate court found that,
in denying fees, the district court had improperly focused on the
litigation position. Though the district court's analysis was arguably correct under the current regulations, the litigation position
was advanced too late in the proceedings and did not adequately

12
justify the agency's initial action. 4

In making substantially justified determinations, courts may do
well to emulate the analysis employed by those circuits which
adopted the underlying action or totality of the circumstances approach. For example, in a case analogous to Battles Farm and decided just prior to the reenactment of EAJA, the Ninth Circuit
employed a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine
that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified. The
119. Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 247, 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
120. Id. at 250.
121. Id. at 253.
122. Id. at 250.
123. 798 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 668.
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court cited the prior adverse
decisions of several district courts as
1 25

relevant to this question.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
also has provided a model for careful analysis of the government's
position. In HaitianRefugee Center v. Meese, 2 " the court awarded
fees for a successful challenge to Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) deportation procedures. The court found that the
government had been justified in certain jurisdictional defenses, 27
and assumed without deciding that the government was also correct in its due process and equal protection arguments. 28 However,
the court found that these justified positions were immaterial
"when it was clear from the caselaw that the plaintiffs would prevail on the [alternative] basis of the INS violating its own
regulations." 2 9
Although the amended EAJA did not provide a clear statutory
definition of the standard for finding the government's position
substantially justified, the Federal Circuit has noted the House Report's approval of a test "slightly more stringent than 'reasonably
justified.' "130 In a reinstatement and back pay dispute the court
found that the government was not substantially justified in relying on a precedent which, in turn, had been decided prior to the
implementation of directly controlling regulations issued by the
Air Force. 3 1 Although the court credibly analyzed the competing
strengths of the arguments in support of the government's position, the case illustrates the difficulties encountered in applying
the substantially justified standard. Further indication that "substantially justified" is a purely individual determination is found in
the split between the circuits over whether adverse precedent from
outside the particular circuit will support a finding that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.'
125. Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1985).
126. 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986).
127. Id. at 1498.
128. Id. at 1499.
129. Id. at 1500 (citing Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677, 683 (11th Cir. 1983)).
130. Schuenemeyer v. United States, 776 F.2d 329, 330 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Spencer
v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984)).
131. Id. at 331.
132. Compare Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1983) (government
justified in litigating case in circuit which had not decided the issue, although another circuit had decided "virtually identical" case adversely), with Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027
(5th Cir. 1984) (government not justified in making argument rejected in another circuit).
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WHICH VERSION IS APPLICABLE?

One of the first well-reasoned opinions to construe the 1985
amendments was Russell v. National Mediation Board.133 In its
earlier decision on the merits, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the National Mediation Board had
"breached its clear statutory mandate by not 'progressing' Russell's application for investigation into the representational dispute. 1 8 4 This decision came in the face of strenuous assertions by
the Board that the court did not have jurisdiction to review its
actions under the Railway Labor Act.13 8 The panel agreed that review should be limited, but found the action to be reviewable
under precedents listing exceptions to the blanket "no jurisdiction" rule.'" Russell, as prevailing party, applied to the district
court for fees under the original EAJA. The district court denied
the application and a different panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
explicitly joining the majority of circuits which had adopted the
litigation position theory. 187 The court initially denied rehearing en
banc on August 5, 1985, but when EAJA was reenacted as
amended that same day, the mandate was withdrawn and the parties were invited to submit briefs on the applicability of the new
statute.3 8
From careful examination of the legislative history, the court determined that the clarifying amendments would apply to the
case.13 9 The government argued that only the original EAJA applied as the merits of the case had been disposed of before the
enactment of the 1985 measure. The amendments provided that
they would be applied to "cases pending" without any indication
as to the qualification of a case in which only the fee application
was pending.1 40 The legislative history was also ambiguous. The
133. 775 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1341 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
135. Id. at 1336. The district court had granted the government's summary judgment
motion on this ground.
136. Id. at 1336-40.
137. Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 764 F.2d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 1985).
138. Russell, 775 F.2d at 1285.
139. Id. at 1286-87.
140. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 7(a),
99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amendments made by this Act shall apply to cases pending on or commenced on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act."
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court cited Bradley v. School Board,14 1 an analogous Supreme
Court case which held that the Education Amendments of 1972142
authorized federal courts to award reasonable attorney's fees in
school desegregation cases. In Bradley, the Court held that the
new statute would apply to cases commenced before its effective
date, relying on "the principle that a court is to apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.' 1 43 The Eighth and Fifth Circuits had
employed this same principle, holding that the original EAJA controlled cases in which a fee application was the only matter pending at enactment. 4 4 Although this position was criticized for failing
to strictly construe a waiver of sovereign immunity, 45 the Fifth
Circuit applied the Bradley rule to the new amendments, finding
that the legislative history supported this interpretation.1 46 The
court further found:
[T]he clarifying amendments . .. do not waive sovereign immunity in the same sense that the original EAJA did; the original
Act created a new liability where none previously had existed,
while the portion of the new Act with which we are concerned-the definition of "position of the United States"-merely
"clarif[ies] the EAJA, consistent with the original Congressional
47
intent and the underlying purposes of the statute.'
Predictably, those courts which took a contrary position on the
applicability of the original EAJA also held that the clarifying
amendments will not apply to cases in which the merits have already been decided. 4 8 This is not in accord with Congress' intent
to expand the liability of the government for fees where agency
actions are not justified.
141. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
142. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 178, 86 Stat. 235, 369 (1972),
repealed by Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, tit. VI, § 617(b)(2), 92
Stat. 2143, 2268 (1978).
143. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
144. United States for Heydt v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982);
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64, 67-68
(5th Cir. 1982).
145. Tongol v. Donovan, 762 F.2d 727, 730-33 (9th Cir. 1985).
146. Russell, 775 F.2d at 1288.
147. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 140).
148. Center for Science in the Pub. Interest v. Regan, 802 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Blackmon v. United States, 807 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1986).
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COMPUTING THE FEE AWARD

In recent years, there has been considerable debate over how
best to calculate attorney's fees awards. Most of the fee-shifting
statutes prior to EAJA left the determination of a reasonable fee
to the courts. ""9 EAJA, however, set a maximum cap of $75 per
hour. 150 In awards under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act, the
courts have developed a standard whereby "exceptional" work is
compensated at correspondingly higher rates, and awarded fees are
multiplied by a variable related to the risk factor or other circumstances of the case.' Several circuits have disapproved the use of
a multiplier in EAJA cases, however, as it would conflict with the
clear congressional intent to limit the fee to the statutory cap. 15

As originally enacted, EAJA provided that a fee could be increased under special circumstances such as an increase in the
cost-of-living index. 153 The amendments did not alter these provisions and several recent cases have increased awarded fees to parallel documented cost-of-living increases. 54
Although the courts possess limited discretion to alter the hourly
rate, they are not statutorily constrained in assessing the reasonableness of the hours claimed. In Gavette v. Office of Personnel
Management,'" the Federal Circuit disallowed hours claimed for a
planned proposal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ' In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 57 the District Court for the District of
Columbia held, "Lawyers claiming fees from the government must
exercise 'billing judgment'[,]"" 8 and a court "'must make appro149. See, e.g., 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATrORNEY FEES § 16.01 (1985).
The most common method is time-based, with various factors influencing the hourly rate.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1982). Both sections allow agency or court adjustments to the $75 cap. Higher fees are justified if they
correspond to an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys.
151. See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
152. See International Woodworkers of America v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.
1986); Bunn v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
153. See supra note 150.
154. See, e.g., Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Heckler,
629 F. Supp. 398, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
155. No. 84-1286, slip op. (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 1986).
156. Id.
157. 649 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1986).
158. Id. at 499 (quoting Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724
F.2d 211, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
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priate reductions if a fees application contains unreasonably expended hours.' 159 The court disallowed fees to a law professor
who acted as co-counsel. The hours were deducted because of insufficient documentation, improper crediting of work performed at
the agency level, and for claimed hours which the court found unreasonable considering the professor's "limited role in [the]
litigation.' 0
Although the amendments to the Act did not make major
changes in computation of fees, they did clarify that the awards
are to come from agency funds rather than the Treasury. 6 ' Presumably, this will further deter unjustified agency actions in accordance with original and reaffirmed congressional intent.
Two other technical amendments may be important in individual cases and are in accord with the thrust of the new amendments
to expand the relief available to parties contesting government actions. The filing time for fees is within thirty days from when an
order becomes final. 62 If the government appeals a fee award and
loses, a new provision authorizes the payment of interest on the
fees from the date they were awarded until the date of
affirmance. 6 3
VII.

CONCLUSION

In awarding fees under the new Act, courts will continue to exercise considerable discretion in interpreting its open-ended provisions. It is important that the Act's original intent be carefully
considered in close cases. Courts deciding whether to award fees to
litigants who prevail against the government should consider the
original purposes of EAJA: to counterbalance conditions tending to
deter private citizens from challenging unjustified governmental
actions and to provide an incentive for the United States to act
responsibly and fairly in the first instance. Clearly, a finding of bad
faith should not be a prerequisite to finding that the government's
position was not substantially justified. The presumption should
be almost the opposite. Only if the government can show that it
was relying in good faith on a controlling judicial precedent or a
159. Id.
160. Id. at 501.
161. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 1(e),
2(d), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (1985) (amending 5 U.S.C. 504(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)
respectively).
162. Id. § 2(c)(2)(D) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)).
163. Id. § 2(e)(f) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
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well-supported statutory interpretation should a finding of substantial justification preclude a successful litigant from recovering
fees.
In addition to the original intent, the strong bipartisan support
for an expanded, permanent version should also aid in judicial construction of EAJA. Every amendment to the Act was in the direction of more, not less, liability for the federal government. The accompanying House Report, based on careful study of the earlier
version will have important persuasive value in the areas of its coverage. Although the most optimistic claims for EAJA as a weapon
against government abuse are inherently unprovable, it will continue to be an effective mechanism for providing a voice for the
public interest in the vital arenas of administrative agencies and
federal courts.

